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Abstract
This paper presents experiments analyzing the strategic behavior of voters under three voting
systems: plurality rule, approval voting, and the Borda count. Strategic behavior is signi¯cantly
di®erent under each treatment (voting system). Plurality rule leads voters to play in a more so-
phisticated manner, but not necessarily insincerely, displaying the lowest levels of manipulation.
The opposite holds for the Borda count games, where players are the least sophisticated but
the most insincere. Approval voting shows intermediate levels of strategic behavior. In terms of
social e±ciency, plurality rule unexpectedly performs better than both approval voting and the
Borda count. Yet, plurality rule is the weakest performer under Condorcet e±ciency, whereas
approval voting and the Borda count perform remarkably well even with a small electorate.
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11 Introduction
Voting is one of the chief foundations on which democracy and its political institutions are con-
structed and developed. Hence, understanding how citizens vote is key both to understanding
democratic processes and to constructing formal models of political institutions.
An issue in voters' behavior that has long been of interest to political science scholars is whether
voters vote \sincerely" for their most preferred alternative or \strategically", casting their vote for
a di®erent alternative in order to induce a better outcome. Let us suppose a voter believes that her
most preferred candidate has little chance of competing for the lead in the election. Voting for such
a candidate may be \wasted." The voter may decide to switch her vote to the expected leading
candidate she most prefers in order to make her vote \pivotal" in determining a better outcome
for herself. This is the trade-o® a rational voter faces in an election. She must balance her relative
preference for the di®erent candidates against the relative likelihood of in°uencing the outcome of
the election.
Gibbard (1973) proved that any preference aggregation method is vulnerable to strategic ma-
nipulation by voters. However it is not clear whether the strategic behavior of the voters leads to
outcomes that are less desirable than the more representative sincere outcomes. On the one hand,
a voting procedure should be thought of as a tool to aggregate the preferences of the society and
the more accurately that voting represents the true preferences, the better the elected political
institutions serve the society's objectives. On the other hand, sophisticated voting outcomes may
be more e±cient or superior to sincere outcomes, electing more often the Condorcet alternative.
As Palfrey (1989) claims, when voters behave in a strategic way and expect others to do the same,
they end up voting for one of the two leading candidates, making the Condorcet alternative more
likely to be elected.
One can think that some rules are more vulnerable than others and that the degree to which they
are empirically a®ected by strategic manipulation by voters in the elections provides an interesting
criterion for evaluating alternative voting rules.
This paper explores the extent that voters engage in such manipulation through the use of
laboratory experiments. The experiments are designed to evaluate the e®ect of di®erent voting
systems and voter experience on the emergence of strategic behavior in committee elections and
how strategic manipulation a®ects the e±ciency of the elections outcomes. Strategic behavior
is studied in a series of complete-information elections in which subjects know both their own
2preferences and the preferences of each member of the committee. The committee is composed
of ¯ve subjects who are asked to vote to elect one of four candidates according to either plurality
voting, approval voting, or the Borda count. Abstention is not allowed, which is justi¯ed by the
small size of the electorate which makes each voter highly likely to be pivotal, and consequently
abstention a dominated strategy.
The experimental literature on voting in committees is wide and increasing. This line of research,
beginning with the landmark articles by Plott (1967), Fiorina and Plott (1978), McKelvey (1976,
1979), and Scho¯eld (1983) explores the cooperative and non-cooperative theory predictions on
voting. The experimental works on multi-candidate elections focus on the fact that almost anything
can happen in equilibrium. The reason is that there are many Nash equilibrium voting strategies
(Palfrey 1989, Myerson and Weber, 1993). This work has been extended in a number of directions.
For example, Gerber, Morton, and Rietz (1998) analyze cumulative voting to see if it can improve
minority representation. Forsythe et al. (1996) explore the multi-candidate elections in a series of
experiments. They compare plurality rule, Borda Count (BC) and Approval Voting (AV), ¯nding
that BC and AV produce better outcomes than plurality rule, in the sense that the Condorcet loser
won the election less frequently.
This paper departs from the existing literature, and in particular from the Forsythe et al. (1996)
paper with which it shares many of the same goals, by predicting unique equilibrium strategies and
by allowing for more than three candidates. The problem of multiplicity of Nash equilibrium
voting strategies is eliminated by adopting the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies
equilibrium re¯nement that allow for a unique sophisticated strategy. The number of alternatives
is increased to four to allow for a non-trivial analysis of voters' strategic behavior under AV (with
three candidates every non-sincere vote is dominated by a sincere one, therefore there is no rational
reason for a voter to move from a sincere behavior to a sophisticated one).1
2 Strategic behavior
Strategy-proofness has received a great deal of attention in social choice theory, where it is frequently
discussed in the context of elections. The ¯rst impossibility result comes from Gibbard (1973) and
1According to the de¯nition of Brams and Fishburn (1978, 1983), when the number of candidates is less or equal
to three, the set of approval voting strategies may be partitioned in two subsets: \dominated" and \admissible
sincere" strategies. This implies that any Nash Equilibrium strategy is also admissible sincere. Extending the
number of candidates to more than three generates a third subset of strategies that are neither admissible sincere
nor dominated.
3Satterthwaite (1975): given some basic conditions on the number of available alternatives and the
size of the electorate, they show that every election procedure which is non-dictatorial cannot be
strategy-proof.
Then, the question turns in designing a voting procedure that is the least manipulable. Ma-
nipulation occurs when a voter behaves strategically (insincerely) and he/she determines a change
in the outcome (i.e., being pivotal). Strategic behavior may be studied in two settings: on the one
hand strategic voting is decision-theoretic when individuals act optimally assuming that others in
the electorate will vote sincerely; on the other hand, a non-myopic voter might account for the
possibility of strategic voting behavior by others. To cope with this, a game-theoretic perspective
is required, such as that taken by Cox (1994) and Myerson and Weber (1993).
When an outcome is strategy proof - from individual deviations - it is a Nash equilibrium
in sincere strategies: the sincere strategy is the best reply to the other players' action for every
player. As Gibbard pointed out, no voting system is able to produce a unique Nash equilibrium
with strategic voters using only sincere strategies. There may exist multiple Nash equilibria with
strategic voting. If the number of voters is greater or equal to three, any candidate may win in a
Nash equilibrium.
A way to deal with this problem of multiplicity of Nash equilibria is to look for equilibrium
re¯nements, such as ruling out weakly dominated voting strategies. Eliminating weakly dominated
strategies, as Besley and Coate (1997) argue, is a reasonable approach in voting games. The ¯rst
step of elimination simply amounts to no player voting for the worst-ranked alternative. But this
does not prevent voters from going one step further and recalculating which strategies are weakly
dominated for them given that other voters will not use the already deleted weakly dominated
strategies (to vote for their worst-ranked candidate).
Allowing players to be strategic and to anticipate that the other voters will not use the weakly
dominated strategies either ( iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies), pins down a set
of possible outcomes in a voting game. This allows the computation of the sophisticated strategies
each voter should use to maximize his own utility for any of the di®erent voting systems. When the
game is dominance-solvable, a unique sophisticated strategy for each player survives the elimination
process, leading to a unique equilibrium.2
As Rajan (1998) shows, any strategy chosen under the iterated weak dominance solution concept
2The order of deletion of weakly dominated strategies doesn't matter here because we assume strict preferences
and maximal simultaneous deletion of weakly dominated strategies as elimination algorithm (see Gale, 1953 and Luce
and Rai®a, 1957).
4can be justi¯ed by beliefs that are consistent with the equilibrium concepts, which requires the
assumption that players know each others' beliefs. Common knowledge of rationality leads to
iterated weak dominance which results in perfect equilibria.
Moreno and Wooders (1996) prove that if a game is dominance solvable, then the unique NE is
also coalition-proof. The iterated elimination re¯nement produces an equilibrium that is not only
resistent to individual deviations but also to deviations by a coalition of players.
The literature about iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies for predicting out-
comes in voting games dates back to the seminal contribution of Farquharson (1969). He calls a
voter \sophisticated" if, after considering all possible votes by others and seeing in which cases his
vote makes a di®erence, he/she eliminates strategies that are dominated and assumes all the other
voters do the same. This process tells the voter which strategies are best in all possible circum-
stances. He called this procedure \sophisticated voting" and de¯ned a voting game \determinate"
if sophisticated voting led to a unique outcome.
The power of the dominance solvability as solution concept has been studied in several exper-
iments. The general ¯nding (Nagel, 1995 and 1999) is that most of the subjects engage in up to
four steps of eliminations. However, the depth of reasoning and rate of learning seem to depend on
group size, sophistication of the players, and previous experience with the game.
The following will brie°y characterize the three voting procedures analyzed in this paper. As-
sume that there are k ¸ 3 candidates and n voters; both k and n are ¯nite. Each voter i has a
strict preference order over the set of candidates. When necessary, assume that the tie breaking
rule is to pick a candidate randomly among those that are receiving the most votes.
De¯nition 1 (Plurality Voting (PV)) Each voter casts a vote for one of the k candidates. The
winner is the candidate with the most votes.
As shown by De Sinopoli and Turrini (2002), in a four (or more) candidate PV game, the
iterated weak dominance equilibrium re¯nement eliminates all the Nash equilibria except for one,
leading to a unique NE strategy.
De¯nition 2 (Borda count (BC)) Each voter ranks k candidates giving k ¡ s points to the sth
candidate. The winner is the candidate with the most points.
It has been proved that this system, above all others, is the one which forces voters to make
strategic decisions instead of encouraging sincere voting (Smith, 1999). Giving a high ranking to a
candidate who is the most viable challenger of a voter's most preferred candidate hurts the chances
5of the preferred candidate winning. For example, a voter might not want to risk giving points
to other candidates if his top choice is in a tight race. Then, given the number and strength of
candidates, a strategic voter may give a high rank to candidates unlikely to win and a low rank to
candidates who are in strong competition with a voter's favorite candidate.
De¯nition 3 (Approval Voting (AV)) Each voter casts a vote for as many of the k candidates
as she wants. The winner is the candidate with the highest total number of votes.
The higher degree of freedom that this system allow to the voters (voters may choose how many
candidates to vote for) leads to non-uniqueness or non-de¯niteness of sincere strategy. Voting for
the most preferred alternative is undoubtedly sincere, but voting for both the most preferred and
the second most preferred alternative may be considered sincere as well. Since under AV a voter is
not limited to cast or to rank a de¯ned number of alternatives, a sincere strategy is indeterminate.
Brams and Fishburn (1978, 1983) de¯ne admissible and sincere strategies under AV. They de¯ne
a strategy \admissible" if it is not dominated, always involves voting for a most-preferred candidate,
and never involves voting for a least preferred candidate. They de¯ne a strategy as \sincere" if,
for any given candidate that a voter casts a vote, the voter also casts a vote for all candidates the
voter ranks higher than that candidate.
From the de¯nition of admissibility it follows that any weakly undominated strategy must belong
to either the set of \admissible sincere" or to the set of \admissible non-sincere" strategies. Notice
that when the number of alternatives is less than or equal to three, all the \admissible strategies"
are also \sincere," meaning that the best reply strategies are always sincere as well.
Even if AV is subject to strategic manipulation, Brams and Fishburn (1978) argue that approval
voting is subject to a milder type of strategic manipulation: voters react to strategic considerations
by truncating their preference scale in a di®erent way (setting their approval cuto® point higher or
lower in their scale), without any need to desert their ¯rst choice.
Yet, sincere voting typically implies non-strategic behavior. Even if the AV sophisticated strate-
gies belong to the set of the \admissible sincere" strategies, these strategies cannot be considered
as sincere, since they are the result of strategic considerations. As Niemi (1984) points out: \...The
fact the AV fails to yield a unique sincere strategy is of major signi¯cance: it means that, under
AV, to say voters use admissible sincere strategies is not equivalent to say that they make no strate-
gic calculation. The existence of multiple, equally sincere admissible strategies, suggests that AV
encourage strategic (albeit admissible) voting...".
63 Experimental design
The experimental design focuses on the case in which information is complete and common to all
players. Information is one of the main determinants of strategic behavior: the incentive to vote
strategically increases with the precision and the type of information (private or common) available
to the voter. Not surprisingly, when voters are not perfectly or privately informed, strategic voting
exhibits negative rather than positive patterns (Feddersen & Pesendorfer, 1997). The intuition is
that the less or more private the information about preferences of other voters, the more a voter
is concerned about switching her vote in the wrong direction. This does not happen when voters
base their decisions on sources of information that are complete and common across voters. Each
voter can be assured that all others are observing the same information, and hence can coordinate
on an appropriate candidate that is believed to be the trailing candidates by all the voters.
The game-theoretic perspective adopted here may lead to the possibility of self-reinforcing
strategic voting. An initial perceived bias in favor of one particular candidate may lead to some
strategic voting away from less favored candidates. But this strategic switching increases the
incentive for others to vote strategically. This process continues until every subject plays a Nash
equilibrium \sophisticated strategy."
In order to allow for learning, every subject participated in twenty, one-shot election rounds.
In order to eliminate repeated e®ects, every subject was randomly matched in a di®erent group at
every round.
3.1 Recruitment and Organization
I conducted three sessions of computerized experiments using undergraduate students at New York
University during the Fall of 2005.3 The experiment was conducted at the Center of Experimental
and Social Sciences(C.E.S.S.) computer lab.
Each experimental session was played by students who enrolled in the NYU e-recruit subject
pool. Students had joined the subject pool voluntarily by completing a form online indicating
their interest in participating in experiments. When a student enrolled for participation in the
experiment, he or she was told only that she would participate in a \voting experiment" and that
\...the experiment will last about one hour. Subjects should earn between $10 and $25...".
The experiment required each participant to cast one or more votes (abstention was not allowed)
3The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree, (Fischbacher 1999).
7Table 1: Number of Observations.
Session First 10 rounds Second 10 rounds # subjects # obs.
1 Plurality (CW) Plurality (Cycle) 10 200
2 Plurality (Cycle) Plurality (CW) 10 200
3 Approval Voting (CW) Approval Voting (Cycle) 10 200
4 Approval Voting (Cycle) Approval Voting (CW) 10 200
5 Borda Count (CW) Borda Count (Cycle) 10 200
6 Borda Count (Cycle) Borda Count (CW) 10 200
Notes - The table reports for each voting systems and each sequence of treatments (in parenthe-
ses), the total number of subjects who participated in the experiment and the total number of
observations.
over the set of candidates. Every subject was asked to vote according to one of the three di®erent
voting rules: PV, AV, and BC.
The experimental design employed a 3x2 design with three sessions and two treatment per
session. I ran the experiment on 60 subjects, 20 per session. The 20 subjects formed four groups,
each comprised of ¯ve subjects. To minimize any possible repeated-game in°uences on the outcomes
of the experiments, the participants were allowed to participate in only one session. Sessions
involved 20 rounds. Each subject was randomly grouped with di®erent members in each round in
such a way that a subject was not in the same group of subjects more than once in each treatment.
Table 1 reports some summary statistics about the experiment.
Asking all the players in the same session to vote according to only one voting rule allows
them to learn how the voting system works during the experiment. This seems reasonable because
elections are usually run with a constant voting system over a long time interval. If a voting system
turns out to be relatively non-manipulable when voters know it well, this is a stronger argument
for its non-manipulability than if voters have only a brief experience with it.
Even if the group within which each subject was asked to play changes from round to round, the
preference pro¯le of the group did not change for ten consecutive rounds. This facilitates learning
especially in small committees. Furthermore, if a voting system did turn out to be less manipulable
in small committees, the result is stronger than if it did so in large committees.
At the beginning of the 11th round, each subject was asked to play according to a di®erent
preference ordering, which remained the same from that round until 20 rounds were completed.
This allowed two di®erent treatments (associated with two di®erent preference pro¯les) per session,
which provides a check for robustness of each voting system. In one treatment the preference pro¯le
of the group allows for the existence of the Condorcet Winner; in the other there was a cycle of
8Table 2: Payo®s Schedule.
Period 1-10 A B C D Period 11-20 A B C D
Type 1 7 5 1 3 Type 1 3 7 1 5
Type 2 7 5 1 3 Type 2 3 7 1 5
Type 3 3 1 7 5 Type 3 7 1 5 3
Type 4 3 1 7 5 Type 4 7 1 5 3
Type 5 5 1 3 7 Type 5 3 5 7 1
Notes - The table reports the number of experimental points each subject would receive if any
of the four candidates won the election. In this session, subjects played the \Condorcet Winner
treatment" in the ¯rst ten periods and the \Cycle treatment" in the last ten periods.
preferences. The former treatment is referred to as the \Condorcet" (CW) treatment and the latter
as the \Cycle" treatment.
After all subjects had arrived, they were assigned to separate cubicles, each with a PC and
a desk. The cubicles were arranged so that the subjects could not see anyone except the ex-
perimenters, nor could they been seen by anyone except the experimenters. Subjects were given
instructions along with tables (Table 2) with the experimental points attached to every potential
winning candidate. The instructions speci¯ed that each earned experimental point would have been
converted into $, at a rate of 20 cents per point, at the end of the experiment.
Within each group, the payo® schedules were identical for every subject. Thus, each subject
knew his or her own payo®s, the payo®s of the other types in the group, and the number of subjects
of each type. However, subjects did not know the speci¯c assignments of types nor the identities
of the other subjects with whom they were grouped.
The instructions were read aloud so that subjects had common knowledge of the voting rules.
After that, subjects were given an opportunity to ask questions. After the instructions, each
subject was randomly assigned the role of one of six types. Types stayed the same throughout the
experiment.
In each election each subject was asked to cast one or more ballots (according to the speci¯c
voting system/treatment), and the candidate with the most votes was declared the winner. Subjects
were informed of the vote totals received by each candidate, how the di®erent types cast their votes,
the winner of the election, and the payo®s each type received from the election (if a tie occurred
between two or more candidates, subjects received a payo® equal to the average value of the tied
winners).
93.2 Voting Equilibria
Preferences are induced in the experiment by a vector of payo®s attached to the alternatives
(ui
1;::::ui
k), where ui
K is the payo® (in terms of experimental points) that voter i would receive
if candidate k won the election. The vectors of payo®s are shown in Table 2.
A social choice analysis of the preference pro¯les shows that candidate \D" is the Condorcet
alternative (the candidate who wins against every other candidate in pairwise comparisons) in the
\CW" treatment; that the Condorcet loser (the candidate who loses against every other candidate
in pairwise comparisons) is candidate \B" in the \CW" treatment and candidate \D" in the\Cycle"
treatment; and that candidate A is the social optimum (the candidate who maximizes the aggregate
payo® of the voting group) in both the treatments.
In order to make both the voting game and the analysis of the results simpler and more intuitive,
only symmetric voting strategies are considered (the strategies of the players depend only on their
preferences and not on payo®-irrelevant factors such as the particular identity of the voter). Three
comments are in order at this point.
First, I do not allow voters to abstain: abstention is always a weakly dominated strategy for
any voter (Brams, 1994) and so will be deleted at the ¯rst round of the iterated deletion process.
Second, since the strategy of voting for one's worst alternative is always weakly dominated as
well as the strategy of not voting for one's best alternative, this will be set as the ¯rst round of the
elimination process for each voting system.
Third, the voting games determined by the preference pro¯les in Table ?? are all dominance
solvable, but they have di®erent characterizations: the number of strategies for each player increases
moving from PV (k) to AV (
Pk
i=1(k
i )) and to BC (k!). At the ¯rst step of elimination, the number of
undominated strategies under PV, AV, and BC are three, seven, and fourteen, respectively. Given
a larger set of strategies under BC, a greater number of steps of elimination of weakly dominated
strategies is required. PV and AV require three steps of eliminations in the Condorcet Winner
treatment and four steps in the Cycle treatment. BC requires six and eight steps respectively.
Under PV and BC, the sets of sincere and sophisticated strategies are singletons. Under AV, the
strategy that is the best reply after three steps of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies
belongs to the set of \admissible sincere" strategies. The \admissible non-sincere" strategy is always
weakly dominated in the iterative process of elimination. The Nash Equilibria of each election, after
n rounds of iterate elimination of weakly dominated strategies, are described in Table 3.
10Table 3: Strategies and Equilibria.
Voting Voter Sincere Sophisticated NE
System type Strategy Strategy Outcome
1 & 2 A A
PV 3 & 4 C C A
5 D A
CW 1 & 2 A, AB, ABD AB
AV 3 & 4 C, CD, CDA CD D
treatment 5 D, DA, DAC D
1 & 2 ABDC ABDC
BC 3 & 4 CDAB DCBA D
5 DACB DACB
1 & 2 B B
PV 3 & 4 A C C
5 C C
Cycle 1 & 2 B, BD, BDA BDA
AV 3 & 4 A, AC, ACD AC A
treatment 5 C, CB, CBA C
1 & 2 BDAC BDAC
BC 3 & 4 ACDB CADB C
5 CBAD CBAD
Notes - The table reports for each voting systems (¯rst column) and each voter's type (second
column), the sincere and sophisticated (Nash Equilibrium) strategies. The last column tells the
Nash Equilibria. The upper panel refers to the `Condorcet winner treatment,' the lower panel refers
to the `Cycle' treatment.
4 Experimental Results
In this section a summary of the election results and individual voter behavior is presented. First,
the election results are summarized for each of the three sessions and two treatments (section 4.1),
and the frequency with which particular candidates, like the Condorcet Winner wins the race is
compared. Second, the occurrence of the Duvergerian races is analyzed in the PV treatment (section
4.2). Third, the observed voters' behavior is analyzed, and sophisticated voting (section 4.3) and
manipulation (section 4.4) is compared across the three voting systems and the two treatments.
Last, the Condorcet e±ciency (section 4.5) and the social e±ciency (section 4.6) of the election
results are discussed.
4.1 Summary of results
All voting systems may produce some undesirable paradoxes like electing the Condorcet loser or
failing to elect the Condorcet winner. Among di®erent voting systems AV and BC are expected to
11Table 4: Summary of Election Results.
Treatment A B C D
Plurality (CW) 61.3% 0.0% 10.0% 28.7%
Approval (CW) 38.1% 6.0% 15.2% 40.6%
Borda (CW) 30.8% 6.7% 18.8% 43.8%
Plurality (Cycle) 11.3% 52.5% 36.2% 0.0%
Approval (Cycle) 31.0% 32.7% 30.2% 6.0%
Borda (Cycle) 39.2% 21.7% 32.1% 7.1%
Notes - The table reports the frequency with which each candidate (columns) wins the election
under di®erent voting systems (rows) and Treatments (the ¯rst three rows refer to the Condorcet
Winner treatment; the last three ones refer to the Cycle treatment).
reduce the frequency of wins by Condorcet losers and to increase the frequency of wins by Condorcet
winners compared to PV (Saari, 1989). In this section, election results are compared for each voting
system in order to see how frequently each produces these paradoxes, and how repetition changes
the election results.
Table 4 shows the frequencies with which each candidate won the elections. The upper panel
shows that when the Condorcet winner exists, it is most likely to be elected by BC and least
likely by PV, which instead elects the social optimum candidate with the largest frequency. The
Condorcet loser is never elected by PV but is elected about 6-7% of the time by AV and BC. The
lower panel illustrates that when there is a cycle in the preference pro¯le of the electorate, all the
candidates but the Condorcet loser are all almost equally likely to win the election (only PV shows
a preponderance for electing two out of the four candidates).
Looking at these summary statistics, it appears that PV performs better compared to the other
voting systems. First of all, the Condorcet loser alternative is never elected under this rule; second,
even if the Condorcet Winner does not win so frequently (30% of the time) as under the other
voting systems, this is mitigated by the fact that more than 60% of the time the winner is the
alternative that maximizes the social welfare.
4.2 Plurality and Duverger's law
The voting outcomes showed in the previous section seems to suggest PV producing the regularity
called Duverger's law, making only two candidates viable and the other candidates permanently
weak.
Duverger (1954) claims that \the single-majority single ballot system favors the two party-
system," suggesting a causality relationship between plurality voting and the structure of the
12Table 5: Duverger's law.
`CW' treatment `Cycle' treatment
Period Inexperienced Experienced Inexperienced Experienced
1 -
p
-
p
2
p p p p
3 -
p
-
p
4 -
p p p
5 -
p p
-
6
p p
- -
7
p p p
-
8 -
p
- -
9 -
p
-
p
10
p
- -
p
Notes - The table shows for which elections Duverger's law is satis¯ed (
p
) or not (-). The sat-
isfaction of Duverger's law is reported for each round (rows) and each treatment for both the
unexperienced subjects and the experienced one (columns).
party system. More recent works reformulate Duverger's Law predicting strict bipartism as the
outcome of any plurality rule election (Cox, 1994; Palfrey, 1989; and Myerson and Weber, 1993).
Palfrey (1989) claims that: \[...] with instrumentally rational voters and ful¯lled expectations,
multicandidate contests under the plurality rule should result in only two candidates getting any
votes." The uniquely stable equilibrium outcome - that is the result of strategic voting - involves
positive support for only two candidates.
In order to capture the occurrence of a Duvergerian election, two criteria are used:
i) Duverger's law predicts that the spread between the candidates who obtain the second and
the third highest vote total is larger than the spread between the candidates who obtain the ¯rst
and the second highest vote total:
(j20j ¡ j30j) > 2 ¢ (j10j ¡ j20j)
ii) Duverger's law predicts that the third candidate, compared with the second one, obtains a
smaller number of votes than expected:
j20j > 2 ¢ j30j
Table 5 shows the elections in which Duverger's Law is supported (satisfying either of the two
criteria above). The ¯rst and the third column refer to the voting subjects who are inexperienced
(i.e., that play the relative voting treatment as ¯rst), while the second and the fourth column refer
to the voting subjects who are experienced (i.e., that played the relative voting treatment as second,
after having experienced the other voting treatment).
13The number of times that Duverger's law is satis¯ed seems to be sensible to the preference
pro¯le of the electorate, as data shows that turning from the \Condorcet Winner Treatment" to
the \Cycle treatment" reduces the Duverger's law occurrence. Furthermore learning a®ects the
frequency of Duvergerian races, as Table 5 shows, when the subjects had experienced a former
treatment, the elections are more likely to be driven by two candidates.
4.3 Strategic behavior
As Farquharson (1969) suggests, if a voter doesn't have a strategy which dominates every other
strategy, it is necessary for him/her to attempt to predict how the other voters are likely to vote
to make the best use of his/her vote. If a voter has complete information of the other voters'
strategies, this is su±cient to determine which strategies will not be chosen by the other voters
(being dominated), pinning down the number of possible contingencies that may be arise. But at
this point, the voter may reconsider his position on the basis of a smaller set of contingencies. This
method reaches conclusions by successively eliminating contingencies that will not happen.
However, the process of successively eliminating dominated strategies may require a substantial
amount of time, especially when the number of players increases. The voting games in our exper-
imental design are di±cult to solve, and the experimental subjects are time constrained. Thus it
would not be surprising to ¯nd that subjects do not immediately play the sophisticated strategy, but
rather play di®erent strategies over the course of the session, converging ultimately toward the so-
phisticated strategy (a QRE analysis which takes into consideration noise behavior in experimental
settings is discussed in detail in section 5). Furthermore, the preference pro¯le of the electorate and
the voting procedure a®ects the players' ability to converge or coordinate on particular equilibria.
The analysis of the voters' behavior is summarized along the following hypotheses (the frequen-
cies with which each type played sophisticated, sincere, and dominated strategies are shown in
Table A1 and Table A2 in the Appendix).
Hypothesis 1: \Voting system" treatment e®ect. Sophisticated behavior is most likely
under PV and less likely under BC.
Sophisticated behavior increases as the number of iterated eliminations and the number of
strategies decreases. Since BC involves a number of eliminations greater than both PV and AV,
it will be likely to display the lowest level of sophisticated behavior. Furthermore, since the set of
strategies is smaller under PV than AV, then PV will be likely to display sophisticated behavior
14Table 6: Sophisticated behavior.
`CW treatment' `Cycle treatment'
PV AV BC PV AV BC
Pooled 0.69 0.45 0.27 0.71 0.40 0.35
Inexperienced 0.71 0.47 0.21 0.61 0.38 0.35
Experienced 0.66 0.42 0.32 0.81 0.42 0.35
Notes - The table reports the frequency with which subjects played the sophisticated strategy. For
each voting system and each treatment, three statistics are given: the ¯rst row for each type reports
the frequency for the pooled subjects, the second row for the non experienced subjects, and the
third row for the experienced subjects (who experienced a early treatment).
more often than AV.
Hypothesis 2: \Preference Pro¯le" Treatment e®ect. Sophisticated behavior is more
likely in the CW treatment than in the Cycle treatment.
Since the \Cycle treatment" implies a greater number of eliminations than the \CW treatment,"
it will be less likely to display sophisticated behavior.
Hypothesis 3: Learning. Sophisticated behavior increases as the number of voting games
experienced by the subjects increases.
Hypothesis 1.
Table 6 summarizes the frequency with which the experimental subjects chose the sophisticated
strategy in each preference pro¯le and voting system treatment. From this ¯rst descriptive analysis,
it seems clear that there is a distinction between the ability to behave sophisticatedly under the
three voting systems. Plurality appears to be the system that induce the players to play the
sophisticated strategy the most (70%), while the Borda Count appears to be the one that is less
likely to lead players to behave in a sophisticated manner. Players under AV play the sophisticated
strategy 40%-45% of the time, which is a fairly standard result in a game involving three steps of
iterative eliminations.
I test the null hypothesis that the sophisticated behavior for the three voting system treatments
comes from populations with the same median using a Wilcoxon non-parametric rank sum test.
Comparing pairwise all three voting treatments (pooling data across CW and Cycle treatments),
the equality of the median is rejected at a 5% signi¯cance level (P-value=5.62e-007 for PV vs
AV, P-value=5.36e-013 for PV vs BC, P-value=0.0374 for AV vs BC). When comparing the three
15voting systems according to the preference pro¯le treatments, the results do not change but for the
comparison between AV and BC, for which the equality cannot be rejected at a 5% signi¯cance
level (P-value=0.88).
In addition, I also used a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to examine whether the distribution of
the observed payo®s was the same across the two treatments. Consistent with the results of
the Wilcoxon test, the equality of distributions is rejected at a 5% signi¯cance level for all the
comparing voting systems (P-value=9.36e-005 for PV vs AV, P-value=6.02e-011 for PV vs BC,
P-value=0.0446 for AV vs BC). Even here, comparing the three voting systems according to the
preference treatments, the results do not change but for the comparison between AV and BC, for
which the equality cannot be rejected at a 5% signi¯cance level (P-value=0.63).
Both the descriptive and the statistical analyses suggest that sophisticated behavior under
di®erent voting systems is signi¯cantly di®erent.
Hypothesis 2.
From Table 6 it is not clear if the preference pro¯le has a signi¯cative e®ect on the sophisticated
behavior. Wilcoxon and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are used again to test the e®ect of the preference
pro¯le treatment.
According to Wilcoxon non-parametric rank sum test, the equality of the median under the \CW
treatment" and the \Cycle treatment" cannot be rejected at a 5% signi¯cance level for PV and AV,
while it is rejected for BC (P-value=0.8522 for PV, P-value=0.3881 for AV, and P-value=0.0592
for BC).
A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test con¯rms the above tests for PV and AV but not for BC: the equality
of distributions cannot be rejected at a 5% signi¯cance level for all the comparing voting systems
(P-value=0.6289 for PV, P-value=0.9808 for AV, P-value=0.6289 for BC). When the distribution of
frequency of sophisticated choices is compared, instead of the median, the equality of distributions
cannot be rejected.
The sophisticated behavior of the players, controlling for the voting system treatment, is not
a®ected by the preference pro¯les of the voting group. As shown by the data, the fact that the
preference pro¯le allows for the existence of a Condorcet alternative does not lead to the voters
choosing more sophisticated strategies.
16Hypothesis 3.
The experimental results do not show any general learning e®ect in the later rounds. However,
as Table A1 and A2 report, the data show a signi¯cant experience e®ect: subjects who experienced
an early treatment played less randomly than subjects who did not (the standard deviation for all
strategies is signi¯cantly lower).
4.4 Manipulation
In order for a scheme to be manipulable, there must be at least one voter whose insincere voting
can cause a change in the set of the winning alternatives.
The most used indices of manipulability like the \tainted", the \F1", and the \expected" index
(see Smith, 1999) measure the susceptibility of a voting rule to strategic voting by computing
the bene¯t a voter would enjoy by misrepresenting her true preference ordering, requiring the
de¯niteness of the voters' sincere strategy. Since AV sincere voting is not de¯nite, an alternative
index of manipulability must be used to compare the manipulability of the three voting systems.
Manipulation occurs when a voter votes insincerely and he/she is pivotal. Then, in order to
have a measure of the manipulation which occurred in the experiment, we compute the number of
times the experimental subjects cast an insincere vote that induced a change in the outcome. As
discussed in section 2, under PV and BC, there is a unique sincere strategy, while under AV, all
the strategies in the set of \admissible sincere" set are equally potentially sincere.
We adopt here three de¯nitions of sincerity under AV:
1. Admissible sincerity: every strategy in the \admissible sincere" set is sincere (Brams and
Fishburn, 1978, 1983).
2. Non-sophisticated sincerity: every strategy in the \admissible sincere" set but the sophisticated
strategy is sincere. Since voters can play strategically by deviating to the \admissible sincere"
sophisticated strategy; only non-sophisticated admissible sincere strategies are considered as
sincere.
3. Pure sincerity: an AV strategy is sincere if a vote is casted for all the candidates whose utility
exceeds the expected utility of the election (Merrill, 1988). Since voters know with certainty
the preferences of every other voter, the expected utility is calculated by assuming that the
other voters play the sophisticated strategy.
17si;t is de¯ned as the sincere vote and ni;t the insincere vote cast by voter i in round t, where
N is the number of voters and T is the number of rounds. The manipulability index of a voting
system is de¯ned as the frequency with which voters cast pivotal (with probability pi;t) insincere
votes.
M =
T X
t
N X
i
ni;tpi;t
NT
(1)
Table 7 reports the score of the di®erent voting systems. BC shows a higher manipulability with
respect to PV in every statistic. Furthermore, as Table A1 and A2 show, most of the insincere votes
are dominated strategies, meaning that voters manipulate the voting outcome in a non-rational way
(choosing weakly dominated strategies).
Table 7 shows how di®erent de¯nitions of AV sincere strategy are critical in determining the
level of manipulation to which AV is vulnerable.
According to the de¯nition of Brams and Fishburn (1978, 1983), with four alternatives, there
are three admissible sincere strategies. Since proposition 4 shows that all the strategies that do not
belong to the \admissible sincere" set are dominated, according to this de¯nition, manipulation
happens only when voters play dominated strategies. Data show that this type of manipulation
occurs 15%-20% of the time.
Yet, this de¯nition doesn't take into account the possibility of manipulating the outcome devi-
ating to \admissible sincere" strategies, which is shown in section 4.3 to occur 40%-45% of the time.
If voters manipulate the outcome by deviating to \admissible sincere" strategies (Niemi, 1984), then
this strategy cannot be considered as sincere. Data show that this type of manipulation occurs
between 50% and 60% of the times.
According to the de¯nition of pure sincerity given by Merrill (1984), data shows that manipu-
lation occurs between 60% and 80% of the times.
As one turns from the ¯rst de¯nition to the second, and then to the third, the set of sincere
strategies becomes smaller and smaller (with four alternatives there are three, two and one sincere
strategies respectively). Not surprisingly, the level of manipulability increases monotonically as the
de¯nition of AV sincere strategies becomes more restrictive (i.e., as the sincere strategy set shrinks).
18Table 7: Individual manipulation.
PV BC AV (1) AV (2) AV (3)
Pooled 0.25 0.63 0.13 0.58 0.60
`CW treatment' Inexperienced 0.27 0.68 0.10 0.57 0.65
Experienced 0.24 0.58 0.16 0.58 0.55
Pooled 0.30 0.48 0.18 0.58 0.81
`Cycle treatment' Inexperienced 0.25 0.46 0.29 0.67 0.76
Experienced 0.35 0.56 0.06 0.48 0.85
Notes - the table reports the manipulability score for the three voting systems under the two
treatments (upper and lower panel). The three AV scores refer to di®erent de¯nition of sincerity.
For each voting system three statistics are given: the ¯rst row for each voting system reports the
score for the pooled subjects, the second row for the non-experienced subjects, and the third row
for the experienced subjects (who experienced a early treatment).
4.5 Condorcet-E±ciency
Numerous criteria have been suggested to help select which voting systems, among various systems
for choosing winners from pro¯les, best re°ect the cumulative will of the electorate. One of the most
common of these is the Condorcet criterion. A candidate is the Condorcet winner if she defeats
each candidate in pairwise majority elections. It is well known that a Condorcet winner need not
exist. However, many feel that a reasonable voting system should elect the Condorcet alternative
whenever such a candidate exists; this is called \Condorcet e±ciency".
For each voting system, Condorcet E±ciency is measured as the percentage of a given class of
elections for which the Condorcet candidate is chosen. Table 8 reports the Condorcet e±ciency
score of each voting system. Consistent with the ¯ndings of other authors, even in small electorates,
PV is the weakest performer, whereas AV and BC perform quite well (with the latter being the
most likely to produce e±cient outcomes consistent with Merrill's work (1984)).
However, the last three rounds of each voting treatment highlight that under PV voters learn
how to manipulate the outcome in a way to elect the Condorcet alternative, while the frequency
with which it is elected under the other voting systems decreases in the last rounds.
None of the voting systems considered in the experimental analysis guarantees the selection
of the Condorcet alternative, but we can see how the sophisticated outcomes are superior to the
sincere outcomes. Recall what the sincere and the sophisticated outcomes would be for each voting
system. The theoretical Condorcet e±ciency if every player behaved sincerely would be 0% for PV,
23% for AV, and 50% for BC. Instead, the theoretical Condorcet e±ciency if every player behaved
sophisticatedly would be 0% for PV and 100% for AV and BC, since the NE candidate for the
19Table 8: Condorcet E±ciency.
Period Plurality Approval Borda
1 12.5% 33% 50%
2 25% 50% 62.5%
3 12.5% 37.5% 37.5%
4 37.5% 25% 83%
5 37.5% 37.5% 58%
6 25% 65% 25%
7 25% 54% 0%
8 25% 54% 33%
9 50% 25% 62.5%
10 37.5% 25% 25%
Average 29% 41% 44%
Last 3 37.5% 34.6% 40.16%
Per. Av
Sincere Outcome 0% 23% 50%
Sophisticated Outcome 0% 100% 100%
Notes - The Condorcet E±ciency is de¯ned as the percentage of a given class of elections for which
the Condorcet candidate is chosen. The Condorcet e±ciency is reported for each round (rows) and
each voting system (columns). After the tenth period row, the overall average and the average of
the last three periods is reported. The last two rows indicate what the Condorcet E±ciency would
be for the sincere and the sophisticated outcomes (breaking the ties with a fair coin and assuming
that under approval voting voters randomizes between sincere strategies).
latter ones coincides with the Condorcet winner.
4.6 Social Welfare E±ciency
The second measure of e±ciency considers the value of each candidate for the entire electorate as
compared with other candidates. As distinct from the notion of Condorcet e±ciency, the intensity
of the electorate's preferences are weighted. Since the intensities of the preferences is usually not
revealed and di±cult to discover by a researcher, this measure of e±ciency is used less frequently
than the ¯rst one. An experimental analysis allows an analysis on intensity of preferences, since
subjects' preferences are functions of the payo®s they receive at the end of the experimental session.
Following Harsanyi (1977), the \social optimum" is the candidate who maximizes the sum of
all voters' utilities. Therefore \social e±ciency" of a voting system is the normalized ratio between
the expected social utilities of the candidate selected by the system and the candidate maximizing
social utility.
Table 9 reports the performance of each voting system. Unexpectedly the PV System performs
20Table 9: Social E±ciency.
Plurality Approval Borda
Period CW Cycle CW Cycle CW Cycle
1 0.93 0.90 0.92 0.88 0.96 0.96
2 0.95 0.91 0.96 0.91 0.89 0.91
3 0.96 0.87 0.91 0.87 0.94 0.83
4 0.94 0.88 0.95 0.87 0.87 0.90
5 0.95 0.87 0.81 0.92 0.93 0.83
6 0.95 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.80 0.87
7 0.98 0.88 0.87 0.93 0.82 0.91
8 0.95 0.92 0.89 0.95 0.79 1.00
9 0.96 0.89 0.95 0.89 0.92 0.86
10 0.94 0.89 0.92 0.88 0.95 0.93
Average 0.95 0.89 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.90
Sincere Outcome 0.88 0.96 0.96 0.87 0.96 0.91
Sophisticated Outcome 1 0.83 0.92 1 0.92 0.83
Notes - The Social E±ciency of a voting system is calculated as the ratio between the expected
social utilities of the elected candidate and the social optimum. The social e±ciency is reported
for each round (rows) and each voting system in both the CW treatment and Cycle treatment
(columns). After the tenth period row, the overall average and the average of the last three periods
is reported. The last two rows indicated what the social e±ciency would be for the sincere and the
sophisticated outcomes (breaking the ties with a fair coin and assuming that under approval voting
voters randomize between sincere strategies).
signi¯cantly better than both AV and BC in the Condorcet winner treatment and approximately the
same as the other two voting systems in the cycle treatment. The explanation is simple: in the ¯rst
treatment, the PV system's Nash Equilibrium, that is the actual outcome in 61% of experimental
elections, is the social optimum candidate. Besides this case, the measure of social e±ciency is
approximately the same across voting systems and treatments.
Note that the social optimum candidate is not always the Condorcet candidate. That is, the
Condorcet criterion and the criterion of maximizing social utility may be di®erent. However, the
Condorcet candidate yields a high level of social e±ciency, even if not the highest one.
Recalling again the sincere and the sophisticated outcomes of each voting system, we can now
analyze if the sophisticated outcomes are superior to the sincere outcomes in terms of social welfare.
Under BC, sincerity always has a positive e®ect on the social welfare of the society, but under PV
and AV this e®ect is not clear, depending on the preference pro¯le of the voting group.
As Table 9 shows, sophisticated behavior may not necessarily lead to more socially e±cient
outcomes: when players act on the basis of individual self-interest alone, their behavior could lead
21to the degradation of the social welfare of the electorate.
5 Quantal Response Equilibrium analysis
Iterated elimination of dominated strategies relies extensively on the assumption of perfect ra-
tionality. However, choice behavior in laboratory is shown to be noisy, revealing mistakes and
inconsistencies over time. In order to evaluate the iterated elimination procedure using data from
laboratory experiments, it is convenient to model a type of noisy behavior that includes the rational-
choice Nash predictions as a limit case.
One way to relax the assumption of noise-free, perfectly rational behavior is to specify a utility
function with a stochastic component. Probabilistic choice models (e.g., logit, probit) have long
been used to incorporate stochastic elements into the analysis of individual decisions, and the quan-
tal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) is the analogous way to model games with
noisy players. The quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is a statistical version of Nash equilibrium,
where every strategy is played with positive probability. Players' beliefs about other players' ac-
tions determines players' expected payo®s from di®erent strategies, which in turn, generates choice
probabilities according to some quantal response function.
An identical and independently distributed stochastic term ¸, accounting for the noise in the
best replies, is added to the expected payo® of each strategy. In the absence of noise (¸=0), the
QRE equilibrium reduces to a Nash equilibrium. Hence, the equilibria described in section 3.2
are limit cases of the quantal response equilibria described here. In order to provide parametric
estimates, a logit speci¯cation of the QRE is analyzed, where the quantal response functions are
logit curves, and ¸ is the response parameter.
The Quantal response functions for the PV and AV games, which describe the voting probability
as \noisy best responses" to the expected payo® of di®erent strategies, are presented in ¯gure 1
and 2 respectively.
Figure 1 presents the relationship between the probability of playing di®erent strategies under
PV and the equilibrium values of ¸ along with the estimated values for both the Condorcet winner
treatment and the Cycle treatment. The curves in the plots show the equilibrium probability
of playing each of the three strategies associated with given values of ¸. For ¸ = 0, the QRE
predicted probability is equal to 0.33. As ¸ increases, the equilibrium probability of playing the
equilibrium strategy (section 3.2) approaches one, while the equilibrium probability of playing the
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Figure 1: Quantal Response Equilibrium functions for PV Games
other strategies approach zero. The vertical lines denote unconstrained estimated value of ¸, and
the small circles denote the observed frequency with which each strategy is played.
Figure 2 presents the quantal response functions for AV games. The curves in the plots show
the equilibrium probability of playing each of the four strategies (three \admissible" and one \not
admissible") associated with given values of ¸. For ¸ = 0, the QRE predicted probability is equal
to 0.25. As ¸ increases, the equilibrium probability to play the equilibria strategy (section 3.2)
approaches one. The vertical lines denote the unconstrained estimated value of ¸, and the small
circles denote the observed frequency with which each strategy is played.
Table 10 reports the estimates of the QRE for the plurality and approval voting games. The
table reports two estimated values of the error term ¸CW and ¸Cycle for the two voting treatments.
The hypothesis that a unique parameter explain the behavior of the subjects for each voting systems
has been tested (H0 : ¸CW ¡¸Cycle = 0). The estimated values for ¸ in the two voting treatments
are ¸PV = 1:84 and ¸AV = 1:28 and the value of the Log Likelihood function is ¡219:96 and
¡404:76 respectively. For both PV and AV, using a likelihood ratio test, the di®erence between
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Figure 2: Quantal Response Equilibrium functions for AV Games
¸CW and ¸Cycle is signi¯cant (the Â2 equals 12.58 and 22.94 respectively), suggesting that a unique
parameter cannot explain the behavior of the subjects in di®erent strategic environments.
As shown by table 10, the QRE estimated probability ¯ts the data better than the Nash
predictions, especially under PV which shows a larger log likelihood value with respect to AV. The
likelihood ratio test suggests that a same estimation for the \noise" does not explain the behavior
under the two treatments: in the cycle treatment, players' best responses are much more noisy
than under the Condorcet winner treatment.
By combining behavior across voting systems, one can analyze whether the e®ect of di®erent
preference aggregation methods on overall voting behavior is di®erent. The estimations of lambda,
constrained to be equal across voting treatments, is ¸CW = 1:70 (LogL=318.31) and ¸Cycle = 1:81
(LogL=313.73) for the Condorcet winner and cycle treatments respectively. For both treatments,
using a likelihood ratio test, the di®erence between ¸CW and ¸Cycle is signi¯cant (the Â2 equals
26.00 and 24.15 respectively), suggesting that a unique parameter cannot explain the behavior of
the subjects under di®erent voting systems.
24Table 10: QRE Estimates
Type 1 & 2 Type 3 & 4 Type 5 ¸
Treatment Votes Data NE QRE Data NE QRE Data NE QRE (-LogL)
1' 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.54 1.00 0.63 0.65 0.00 0.66
Plurality 2' 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.40 0.00 0.34 0.35 1.00 0.32 2.67
CW 3' 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 (-99.44)
1' 0.93 1.00 0.89 0.46 0.00 0.43 0.73 1.00 0.72
Plurality 2' 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.49 1.00 0.52 0.25 0.00 0.22 1.78
Cycle 3' 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.06 (-114.23)
1' 0.35 0.00 0.35 0.30 0.00 0.32 0.20 1.00 0.68
Approval 1'-2' 0.41 1.00 0.38 0.60 1.00 0.46 0.60 0.00 0.17 1.30
CW 1'-2'-3' 0.08 0.00 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.14 0.05 0.00 0.09 (-205.87)
1'-3' 0.04 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.06
1' 0.30 0.00 0.44 0.19 0.00 0.10 0.40 1.00 0.70
Approval 1'-2' 0.36 1.00 0.39 0.65 0.00 0.66 0.30 0.00 0.29 3.67
Cycle 1'-2'-3' 0.15 0.00 0.11 0.04 1.00 0.21 0.03 0.00 0.01 (-178.42)
1'-3' 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.00
Notes - The table reports, for each voter type (column) and each strategy (rows), the observed fre-
quency and the forecasted probability of casting a vote by NE and QRE under the four treatments.
Under PV, three strategies are reported: casting the vote for the ¯rst choice (sincere strategy),
the second and the third choice. Under AV, the three admissible sincere strategies are reported
(casting the vote for the ¯rst choice, for the ¯rst two choices, and for the ¯rst three choices) along
with the dominated strategy of casting a vote for the ¯rst and the third choice.
These results are consistent with the test of hypothesis in section 4.3: the sophisticated behavior
of the players is a function of the di®erent voting system treatments, and of the preference pro¯les
of the voting groups.
6 Conclusions
This paper reports the results from experiments designed to test the e®ects of di®erent voting
systems on strategic behavior and election outcomes. Laboratory experiments allow for control
of intensity of preferences and voter information. From the analysis, one of the main results is
that voters appear to be playing the best reply strategy a signi¯cantly high number of times.
Sophisticated voting is common: across all 240 elections, 70% of the subjects voted the Nash
Equilibrium strategy under the PV system, 42% of the subjects under AV, and 31% under BC
(sophisticated behavior under di®erent voting systems is signi¯cantly di®erent controlling for both
preference pro¯les and subjects' experience).
Surprisingly, subjects play the unique equilibrium strategy more often than the existing litera-
25ture on iterated solvable games would suggest, and subjects also engage in three or more steps of
elimination signi¯cantly more often.
It is worth noting that dominated (and insincere) behavior is quite frequent, especially when
the voting system allows for a higher degree of freedom (i.e., when the voter may cast more than
a single vote or rank the alternatives). In fact subjects casted dominated ballots between 10% and
18% of the time under either PV or AV, but these percentages increase to 40%-50% under BC.
Though such actions are labelled \dominated," they can be interpreted as strategic attempts to
manipulate the elections results, therefore providing greater support to the evidence that subjects
are not \naive."
Under PV, the experimental outcomes provide support for Duverger's law, in creating two-
candidate elections races, especially when the subjects are experienced. This result is consistent
with Gerber et al. (1998) and Forsythe et al. (1996), who ¯nd support for Duverger's law creating
two-candidate races. The frequency of Duvergerian races seems to be sensible to the preference
pro¯le of the electorate, as data show that the absence of a Condorcer candidate reduces the
Duverger's law occurrence.
To analyze the manipulability of the three voting systems, the number of times the experimental
subjects cast an insincere vote that induced a change in the outcome is compared. Three de¯nitions
of sincerity under AV are adopted: the Brams and Fishburn's (1978, 1983) de¯nition of \admissible
sincerity," the Merrill's (1988) de¯nition of \pure sincerity," and an intermediate de¯nition that
considers all the strategies in the \admissible sincere" set as sincere except the sophisticated one.
Data show how the three di®erent de¯nitions of AV sincere strategy are critical in determining the
level of manipulation to which AV is vulnerable. Under the ¯rst de¯nition, AV is almost always
the least manipulated, but when a more restrictive de¯nition is adopted, the level of manipulation
dramatically increases, showing levels of manipulation sometimes larger than BC (which is on
average the most manipulated one).
According to the mild de¯nition of AV \admissible sincerity," AV displays by far the lowest
level of manipulation. Elsewhere, PV is the system which displays the lowest level of individual
manipulation. This is because under PV, it is not optimal for all the voters to vote insincerely, but
only for the voters who do not support the trailing candidates. Under AV and BC, this is not the
case.
In terms of social e±ciency, unexpectedly the PV System performs signi¯cantly better than
both AV and BC (producing an outcome 5% more e±cient) in the Condorcet Winner treatment,
26while all voting systems perform equally well in the Cycle treatment (producing a social welfare
equal to 90% of the optimum social welfare). Yet, consistent with the literature, PV is the weakest
performer under Condorcet e±ciency, whereas AV and BC perform remarkably well even with a
small electorate. However, in the last three rounds, PV's performance improves signi¯cantly while
the performances of AV and BC decrease.
A Quantal Response analysis shows that the QRE concept ¯ts the experimental data better
than the Nash equilibrium. The estimated value of ¸ for PV is fairly high under the Condorcet
Winner treatment, meaning that players play the Nash equilibrium strategies. However in the
Cycle treatment, players' best responses are more a®ected by noise. This implies that the analysis
of sophisticated behavior is not robust across di®erent preference pro¯les. The value of the Log
likelihood for AV games is not as high as for PV, meaning that a Quantal response interpretation
does not ¯t the data as well as under PV. This implies that under AV, voters' best responses are
more a®ected by noise. Even here, the di®erence under the two treatments is signi¯cant suggesting
that di®erent strategic environments do matter in the the strategic analysis of voting games.
7 Appendix
7.1 Instructions
You are about to participate in an experimental session on voting procedures and you will be paid
for your participation with a cash voucher privately at the end of the session. What you earn
depends partly on your own decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance.
Please turn o® pagers and cellular phones now. Please close any programs you may have open on
the computer.
The entire session will take place through computer terminals and all interaction between you
and other session participants will take place through the computers. Please do not attempt to
directly communicate with other participants during the session. If you have any question during
the experiment, ask the experimenter and she will answer them for you. Other than these questions,
you must keep silent until the experiment is completed. If you break silence while the experiment
is in progress, you will be asked to leave the experiment.
277.1.1 Voting groups
This experiment will last for 20 periods. In each period you will be placed into groups of 5 people.
You will not be told who else is in your group. You and the other members of your group will be
asked to make a decision in that period. Then the next period you will be placed into new groups
and again asked to make decisions, and so forth, for 20 periods. Thus, in each period the group
memberships will be di®erent from the memberships in previous periods and you will not belong
to the same group more than once.
In each period, the group is asked to choose one alternative among a set of four: A, B, C, and
D. Every member of the group is asked to vote accordingly to the rule discussed in the following
screens. The votes cast will determine the winning alternative in that period.
In each period you may earn some "experimental points" which will be converted into $, at a
rate of 20 cents for every point, at the end of the experiment.
7.1.2 Types
At the beginning of this experiment each of you will be randomly assigned a type (1, 2, 3, 4 or 5).
The type you are assigned to will remain the same for the entire experiment. Each group will be
composed of one person of each type.
7.1.3 Payo®s
In each round, the payo® you will receive will depend upon the winning alternative in your group.
The Payo® Tables show the payo®s you will receive if any of the four alternatives wins. In the
Payo® Tables you will also ¯nd the payo®s that other types of voters will receive depending on
which alternative wins. This means that every member of the group knows the payo®s that the
other members of the group will receive if each of the four alternatives wins.
The payo® schedule will stay the same for 10 periods. At the beginning of the 11th period, the
payo®s will change for all types of voters as shown in the Payo® Table. -Please look at the Payo®
Tables now-
In the Payo® Table you will ¯nd two tables. The ¯rst one tells you the payo®s that every type
will gain in the ¯rst 10 periods (periods: 1 - 10). The second one tells you the payo®s that every
member will get in the last 10 periods (periods: 11 - 20).
28Period 1-10 A B C D Period 11-20 A B C D
Type 1 7 5 1 3 Type 1 3 7 1 5
Type 2 7 5 1 3 Type 2 3 7 1 5
Type 3 3 1 7 5 Type 3 7 1 5 3
Type 4 3 1 7 5 Type 4 7 1 5 3
Type 5 5 1 3 7 Type 5 3 5 7 1
7.1.4 Example: How to read the table
Let's take the ¯rst table. It tells you the payo®s you and the other members of the group would
receive for every potential winning alternative.
For example, in each of the ¯rst ten periods, if alternative C wins, members of type 1 and 2
will get 1 experimental point, members of type 3 and 4 will get 7 points, and members of type 5
will get 3 points. After the 10th round, the payo®s attached to each alternative changes. Now if
alternative C wins, members of types 1 and 2 will get 5 experimental points, members of types 3
and 4 will get 1 point, and members of type 5 will get 7 points.
Whenever a tie occurs between 2 alternatives, each member gets the average of the experimental
points attached to each alternative. For example, in each of the ¯rst ten periods, if alternative A
and C tie, members of type 1 and 2 will get 4 experimental points, members of type 3 and 4 will
get 5 points, and members of type 5 will get 4 points.
7.1.5 Voting Rule
If PV treatment.
You may cast only 1 vote for an alternative of your choice. You can change your ballots until you
press the button "Continue", but you cannot change the ballot after that. After all the members
of the group have casts their ballots, the number of votes for every alternative will be summed up.
You will be told the total number of votes each alternative receives in your group. The alternative
with the highest number of votes in your group will be the winner of the election in your group. If
two or more alternatives tie with equal (highest) vote totals, your payo® will be the average of the
payo®s you attach to each tying alternative.
If AV treatment.
You may cast only 1 vote for one or more alternatives of your choice. You can change your
ballots until you press the button "Continue", but you cannot change the ballot after that. After
all the members of the group have casts their ballots, the number of votes for every alternative will
29be summed up. You will be told the total number of votes each alternative receives in your group.
The alternative with the highest number of votes in your group will be the winner of the election
in your group. If two or more alternatives tie with equal (highest) vote totals, your payo® will be
the average of the payo®s you attach to each tying alternative.
If BC treatment.
You may cast your ballot by ranking the 4 alternatives from the most preferred to the least
preferred one. A decreasing number of score points will be attached to them starting from 3 points
for your most preferred to 0 points for the least preferred. You can change your ballots until you
press the button "Continue", but you cannot change the ballot after that. After all the members of
the group have casts their ballots, the number of score points for every alternative will be summed
up. You will be told the total number of points each alternative receives in your group. The
alternative with the highest number of points in your group will be the winner of the election in
your group. If two or more alternatives tie with equal (highest) points totals, your payo® will be
the average of the payo®s you attach to each tying alternative.
7.1.6 Example: How the voting rule works
If PV treatment.
Let's suppose that 1 member voted for A; 1 member for B; 1 member for C; and 2 members for
D. D would win, since D received the highest number of votes. The payo®s would be: types 1 and
2 would get 3 experimental points; types 3 and 4 would get 5 points; type 5 would get 7 points
7.2 Tables of experimental results
30Table A1: Voters' behavior in CW treatment.
Plurality Approval Voting Borda
Sinc Soph Dom Sinc Soph Dom Sinc Soph Dom
Pooled 1:00 0:00 0:43 0:41 0:16 0:39 0:61
(0.00) (0.00) (0.22) (0.23) (0.19) (0.13) (0.13)
1&2 Non Exp 1:00 0:00 0:53 0:43 0:04 0:35 0:65
(0.00) (0.00) (0.25) (0.29) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13)
Exp 1:00 0:00 0:33 0:39 0:28 0:43 0:57
(0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.17) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12)
Pooled 0:54 0:46 0:34 0:60 0:06 0:34 0:08 0:58
(0.26) (0.26) (0.23) (0.25) (0.11) (0.23) (0.12) (0.25)
3&4 Non Exp 0:55 0:45 0:28 0:63 0:09 0:30 0:03 0:67
(0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.32) (0.13) (0.28) (0.08) (0.29)
Exp 0:53 0:47 0:40 0:57 0:03 0:38 0:13 0:49
(0.28) (0.28) (0.21) (0.17) (0.08) (0.18) (0.13) (0.17)
Pooled 0:65 0:35 0:00 0:65 0:20 0:15 0:40 0:60
(0.40) (0.40) (0.00) (0.37) (0.25) (0.24) (0.21) (0.21)
5 Non Exp 0:55 0:45 0:00 0:55 0:25 0:20 0:30 0:70
(0.37) (0.37) (0.00) (0.37) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Exp 0:75 0:25 0:00 0:75 0:15 0:10 0:50 0:50
(0.42) (0.42) (0.00) (0.35) (0.24) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes - The table reports the average frequency with which voters play sincere, sophisticated, and
dominated strategies under di®erent voting systems (columns). Standard deviations are in paren-
thesis. For each type of voter (row), three statistics are given respectively for pooled subjects, for
the non experienced subjects, and for the experienced subjects (who experienced a early treatment).
31Table A2: Voters' behavior in Cycle treatment.
Plurality Approval Voting Borda
Sinc Soph Dom Sinc Soph Dom Sinc Soph Dom
Pooled 0:93 0:07 0:66 0:15 0:19 0:48 0:52
(0.14) (0.14) (0.365) (0.19) (0.21) (0.16) (0.16)
1&2 Inexp 1:00 0:00 0:43 0:22 0:35 0:43 0:57
(0.00) (0.00) (0.37) (0.22) (0.175) (0.17) (0.17)
Exp 0:85 0:15 0:89 0:08 0:03 0:53 0:47
(0.18) (0.18) (0.13) (0.12) (0.08) (0.14) (0.14)
Pooled 0:46 0:49 0:05 0:23 0:65 0:12 0:61 0:19 0:20
(0.31) (0.29) (0.10) (0.27) (0.29) (0.13) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
3&4 Inexp 0:65 0:30 0:05 0:26 0:57 0:16 0:68 0:20 0:12
(0.27) (0.20) (0.11) (0.24) (0.17) (0.12) (0.21) (0.20) (0.18)
Exp 0:28 0:67 0:05 0:20 0:73 0:08 0:54 0:18 0:28
(0.22) (0.24) (0.11) (0.31) (0.37) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14)
Pooled 0:73 0:27 0:33 0:40 0:27 0:43 0:57
(0.38) (0.38) (0.30) (0.31) (0.34) (0.29) (0.29)
5 Inexp 0:45 0:55 0:30 0:30 0:40 0:50 0:50
(0.37) (0.37) (0.26) (0.26) (0.32) (0.24) (0.24)
Exp 1:00 0:00 0:35 0:50 0:15 0:35 0:65
(0.00) (0.00) (0.34) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34)
Notes - The table reports the average frequency with which voters play sincere, sophisticated, and
dominated strategies under di®erent voting systems (columns). Standard deviations are in paren-
thesis. For each type of voter (row), three statistics are given respectively for pooled subjects, for
the non experienced subjects, and for the experienced subjects (who experienced a early treatment).
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